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Abstract. As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient
to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on
related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition
is at most k.
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1 Introduction
Many concepts of game theory are now being studied in the context of computer science. This convergence of
different disciplines raises new and interesting questions not previously studied in either of the original areas
of study. Much of this interest in game theory within computer science is due to the seminal papers of Nisan
and Ronen [20] and Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [17].
A Nash equilibrium ([19]) is a state in a noncooperative game that is stable in the sense that no agent can
gain from unilaterally switching strategies. There are many “solution concepts” used to study the behavior of
selfish agents in a non-cooperative game. Many of these are variants and extensions of the original ideas of
John Nash from 1951.
One immediate objection to Nash equilibria as a solution concept is that agents may in fact collude and
jointly choose strategies so as to “profit”. There are many possible interpretations of the statement that a set of
agents “profit” from collusion. One natural interpretation of this statement is the notion of a strong equilibrium
due to Aumann [5], where no coalition of players have any joint deviation such that every member strictly
benefits. Whereas mixed strategy Nash equilibria always exist for finite games [19], this is not in general true
for strong equilibria.
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Holzman and Law-Yone [16] characterized the set of congestion games that admit strong equilibria. The
class of congestion games studied was extended by Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz in [21]. [21] also considered mixed
strong equilibria and correlated mixed strong equilibria under various deviation assumptions, pure, mixed and
correlated. Variants of strong equilibria include limiting the set of possible deviations (coalition-proof equililbria
[8]) and assuming static predefined coalitions ([15, 14]).
The term price of anarchy was coined by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [17]. This is the ratio between
the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibria and the cost of the social optimum. A related notion is the price
of stability defined in [3], the ratio between the cost of the best Nash equilibria and the cost of the social
optimum. These concepts have been extensively studied in numerous settings, machine load balancing [17, 18,
11, 7, 10], network routing [22, 6, 9], network design [4, 12, 1, 3, 13], etc.
Andelman et al. [2] initiated the study of the strong price of anarchy (SPoA), the ratio of the worst case
strong equilibria to the social optimum. The authors also define the notion of a k-strong equilibrium, where no
coalition of size up to k has any joint deviation where all strictly benefit. Analogous definitions can be made
for the k-strong price of anarchy.
One may argue that the strong price of anarchy (which is never worse than the price of anarchy) removes
the element of poor coordination and is entirely due to selfishness. Likewise, the k-strong price of anarchy
measures the cost of selfishness and restricted coordination (up to k agents at once).
Our work here is a direct continuation of the work of Andelman et al. [2], and addresses many of the open
problems cited there, in particular in the context of a load balancing game. In this setting agents (jobs) choose
a machine, and job j placed on machine i contributes wj(i) to the load on machine i. Agents seek machines
with small load, and the social cost usually considered is the makespan, i.e., the maximal load on any machine.
Whereas [2] considered strong price of anarchy and k-strong price of anarchy for unrelated machines, herein
we primarily consider the strong price of anarchy for related machines (machines having an associated speed).
Our results.
1. Czumaj and Vocking [11] showed that the price of anarchy for load balancing on related machine is
Θ(logm/log logm), we show that the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machine is
Θ
(
logm/(log logm)2
)
. This is our most technically challenging result.
2. We also give tight results for the problems considered by [2]:
(a) In [2] the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on m unrelated machines was shown to lie between
m and 2m− 1. We prove that the true value is always m.
(b) In [2], the k-strong price of anarchy for load balancing of n jobs on m unrelated machines is be-
tween O(nm2/k) and Ω(n/k). We prove that the k-strong price of anarchy falls in between and is
Θ(m(n−m+ 1)/(k −m+ 1)).
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2 Preliminaries
A load balancing game consists of a setM = {M1, . . . ,Mm} of machines, a set N = {1, . . . , n} of jobs (agents).
We use the terms machine i or machine Mi interchangeably. Each job j has a weight function wj() such that
wj(i) is the running time of job j on machine Mi. When the machines are unrelated then wj() is an arbitrary
positive real function. For related machines, each job j has weight, denoted by wj , and each machine Mi has a
speed, denoted by v(i). The running time of job j on machine i is wj(i) = wj/v(i) where wj is the weight of job
j. In game theoretic terms, the set of strategies for job j is the set of machines M . A state S is an assignment
of jobs to machines. Let mS(j) be the machine chosen by job j in state S. The load on machine Mi in state S
is
∑
j|Mi=mS(j) wj(i).
Given a state S in which job j is assigned to machine Mi, we say that the load observed by job j is the load
on machine Mi in state S. The makespan of a state S is the maximum load of a machine in S. Jobs seek to
minimize their observed load. The state OPT (the social optimum) is a state with minimal makespan. We also
denote the makespan in state OPT by OPT, and the usage would be clear from the context.
A strong equilibrium is a state where no group of jobs can jointly choose an alternative set of strategies so
that every job in the group has a reduced observed load in the new state. In a k-strong equilibrium we restrict
such groups to include no more than k agents. The strong price of anarchy is the ratio between the makespan
of the worst strong equilibrium and OPT. The k-strong price of anarchy is the ratio between the makespan of
the worst k-strong equilibrium and OPT.
3 Related Machines
Czumaj and Vocking [11] show that the price of anarchy of load balancing on related machines isΘ(logm/ log logm).
We show that the lower bound construction of [11] is not in strong equilibrium. We also give a somewhat weaker
(and tight) lower bound of Ω(logm/(log logm)2). We first present the lower bound of [11] and claim that it is
not resilient to deviation by coalitions.
The lower bound of [11]:
Consider the following instance in which machines are partitioned into ` + 1 groups. Let these groups be
G0, G1, . . ., G` with mj machines in group Gj . We define m0 = 1, and mj+1 = (` − j) ·mj for j = 1, . . . , `.
Since the total number of machines m =
∑`
j=0mj and m` = `!, it follows that ` ∼ logm/ log logm. Suppose
that all machines in Gj have speed 2(`−j).
Consider the following Nash equilibrium, every machine in Gj receives ` − j jobs, each of weight 2(`−j).
Each such job contributes 1 to the load of its machine. The total load on every machine in Gj is therefore `− j.
Machines in group G` have no jobs assigned to them.
The makespan is `, obtained on machines of group G0. Consider some job assigned to a machine from group
Gj , this job has no incentive to migrate to a machine in a group of lower index since the load there is already
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higher than the load it currently observes. If a job on a machine in Gj migrate to a machine in Gj+1 then it
would observe a load of `− (j + 1) + 2(`−j)/2(`−(j+1)) = `− j + 1 > `− j and even higher loads on machines
of groups Gj+2, . . . , G`.
For the minimal makespan, move all jobs on machines in Gj to machines in Gj+1 (for j = 0, . . . , ` − 1).
There are sufficiently many machines so that no machine gets more than one job, and the load on all machines
is 2`−j/2`−(j+1) = 2. The price of anarchy is therefore Ω(logm/log logm). (This is also shown to be an upper
bound).
However, this is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The above Nash equilibrium is not in strong equilibrium for ` > 8.
Proof. Consider the following scenario. We consider a deviation by a coalition consisting of all ` jobs on
some machine of group G0 (machine M) along with 3 jobs from each of ` different machines from group G2
(machines N1, N2, . . . , N`). We describe the actions of the coalition in two stages, and argue that all members
of the coalition benefit from this deviation.
All ` jobs located on machine M ∈ G0 migrate to separate machines N1, N2, . . . , N` in group G2.
Following this migration, the load on machines Ni is `+ 2 (it was `− 2, we added a job from machine M
that contributed an extra 4 to the load). The load on machine M has dropped to zero (all jobs were removed).
Now, remove 3 original jobs (with weight 2`−2) from each of the Ni machines and place them on machine
M . The load on machine Ni has dropped to `− 1, so the job that migrated from machine M to machine Ni is
now experience lower load than before. The load on machine M is now 3` · 2`−2/2` = 3`/4 < `− 2, for ` > 8.
Thus, the jobs that migrated from machines in G2 to machine M also benefit from this coalition.
3.1 Lower bound on strong price of anarchy for related machines.
Theorem 1. The strong price of anarchy for m related machines and n jobs is Ω
(
logm/(log logm)2
)
.
Proof. Consider the following instance in which machines are partitioned into `+1 groups. Let these groups be
G0, G1, . . ., G`. We further subdivide each group Gi, 0 ≤ i < `, into log ` subgroups, where all machines within
the same subgroup have the same speed, but machines from different subgroups of a group differ in speed. The
group G` consists of a single subgroup F` log `. In total, we have ` log `+ 1 subgroups F0, F1, . . . , F` log `, where
subgroups F0, . . . , Flog `−1 are a partition of G0, Flog `, . . . , F2 log `−1 are the subgroups of G1, etc. The speed of
each machine in subgroup Fj is 2(` log `−j).
Let mj denote the number of machines in subgroup Fj , 0 ≤ j ≤ ` log `. Then m0 = 1, and for subgroup
Fj+1 such that Fj ⊂ Gi we define mj+1 = (` − i) ×mj . It follows that the number of machines in subgroup
F` log ` is at least (`!)log ` and therefore m ≥ (`!)log ` and ` ∼ logm/(log logm)2.
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Consider the following state, S. Each machine of group Gi is assigned `− i jobs. Jobs that are assigned to
machines in subgroup Fj have weight 2(` log `−j). As the speed of such machines is 2(` log `−j), it follows that
each such job contributes one to the load of the machine it is assigned to. I.e., the load on all machines in Gi
is `− i. Machines of F` log ` have no jobs assigned to them.
The load on the machines in group G0 is ` which is also the makespan in S. The minimal makespan (OPT)
is attained by moving the jobs assigned to machines from Fj each to a separate machine of subgroup Fj+1, for
0 ≤ j < ` log `. The load on all machines is now 2` log `−j/2` log `−(j+1) = 2.
State S is a Nash equlibrium. A job assigned to a machine of subgroup Fj has no incentive to migrate to
a machine with a lower indexed subgroup since the current load there is equal or higher to the current load
it observes. There is no incentive to migrate to a higher indexed subgroup as it observes a load of at least
`− j+1 > `− j. We now argue that state S is not only a Nash Equilibrium but also a strong Nash equilibrium.
First, note that jobs residing on machines of group Gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 2, have no incentive to migrate to
machines of group Gj , for j ≥ i+ 2. This follows since the speed of each machine in group Gj is smaller by a
factor of more than 2log ` = ` from the speed of any machine in group Gi. Thus, even if the job is alone on such
a machine, the resulting load is higher than the load currently observed by the job (current load is ≤ `). Thus,
any deviating coalition has the property that jobs assigned to machines from group Gi may only migrate to
machines from groups Gj , for j ≤ i+ 1.
Suppose that jobs that participate in a deviating coalition are from machines in groups Gi, Gi+1, . . ., Gj ,
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ `. The load on machines from group Gi holding participating jobs must strictly decrease since
either jobs leave (and the load goes down) or jobs from higher or equal indexed groups join (and then the load
must strictly go down too). If machines from group Gi have their load decrease, and all deviating jobs belong to
groups i through j, i < j, then there must be some machine M ∈ Gp, i < p ≤ j, with an increase in load. Jobs
can migrate to machineM either from a machine in group Gp−1, or from a machine in group Gj for some j ≥ p.
If a deviating job migrates from a machine in Gj for some j ≥ p then this contradicts the increase in the
load on M . The contradiction arises as such jobs will only join the coalition if they become strictly better off,
and for this to happen the load on M should decrease.
However, this holds even if the deviating job migrates to M from a machine in Gp−1. The observed load
for this job prior to deviating was `− (p− 1) and it must strictly decrease. A job that migrates to machine M
from Gp−1 increases the load by an integral value. A job that migrates away from machine M decreases the
load by an integral value too. This implies that the new load on M must be an integer smaller than `− (p−1),
which contradicts the increase in load on M . uunionsq
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4 Upper bound on strong price of anarchy for related machines.
We assume that machines are indexed such that v(i) ≥ v(j) for i < j. We also assume that the speeds of the
machines are scaled so that OPT is 1. Let S be an arbitrary strong Nash equilibrium, and let `max be the
maximum load of a machine in S. Our goal is to give an upper bound on `max. When required, we may assume
that `max is a sufficiently large constant, since otherwise an upper bound follows trivially. Recall that machines
are ordered such that v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(m) > 0. Let `(i) be the load on machine Mi, i.e., the total weight
of jobs assigned to machine Mi is `(i)v(i).
4.1 Sketch of the proof
We prove that m = Ω(`max`max log `max), which implies `max = O(logm/(log logm)2). To show that m =
Ω(`max`max log `max) we partition the machines into consecutive disjoint “phases” (Definition 1), with the prop-
erty that the number of machines in phase i is Ω(`) times the number of machines in phase i− 1 (Lemma 4.3),
where ` is the minimal load in phases 1 through i.
For technical reasons we introduce shifted phases (s-phases, Definition 2) which are in one-to-one correspon-
dence to the phases. We focus on the s-phases of faster machines, so that the total drop in load amongst the
machines of these s-phases is about `max/2. We next partition the s-phases into consecutive blocks. Let δi be
the load difference between slowest machine in block i− 1 and the slowest machine in block i. By construction
we get that
∑
δi = Θ(`max).
We map s-phases to blocks such that each s-phase is mapped to at most one block as follows (Lemmas 7
and 8), see Fig. 1.
– If δi < 1/ log `max ⇒ we map a single (1 = dδi log `maxe) s-phase to block i
– If δi ≥ 1/ log `max ⇒ we map Ω(δi log `max) s-phases to block i
Therefore the total number of s-phases is at least
∑
δi log `max = Ω(`max log `max). Given the one-to-one
mapping from s-phases to phases, this also gives us a lower bound of Ω(`max log `max) on the number of phases.
In Lemma 4.3 we prove that the number of machines in phase i is Ω(`max) times the number of machines
in phase i− 1. This allows us to conclude that the total number of machines m = Ω(`max`max log `max), or that
`max = O(logm/(log logm)2).
4.2 Excess Weight and Excess Jobs
Given that the makespan of OPT is 1, the total weight of all jobs assigned to machine σ in OPT cannot exceed
v(σ), the speed of machine σ. We define the excess weight on machine 1 ≤ σ ≤ m to be X(σ) = (`(σ)−1)v(σ).
(Note that excess weight can be positive or negative).
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δ3 ≤ 1/ log ` δ4 ≤ 1/ log `δ1 > 1/ log `
B0 B1 B2
P (B1) P (B3) P (B4)
Fig. 1. The machines are sorted in order of decreasing speed (and increasing index), and partitioned into s-phases. The
s-phases are further partitioned into blocks Bi. The s-phases that are mapped to block i are marked P (Bi).
Given a set R ⊂ {1, . . . ,m}, we define the excess weight on R to be
X(R) =
∑
σ∈R
X(σ). (1)
For clarity of exposition, we use intuitive shorthand notation for sets R forming consecutive subsequences of
1, . . . ,m. In particular, we use the notation X(σ) for X({σ}), X(≤ w) for X({σ|1 ≤ σ ≤ w}), X(w . . . y) for
X({w ≤ σ ≤ y}), etc.
Given that some set of machines R has excess weight X(R) > 0, it follows that there must be some set of
jobs J(R), of total weight at least X(R), that are assigned to machines in R by S, but are assigned to machines
in {1, . . . ,m}−R by OPT. Given sets of machines R and Q, let J(R 7→ Q) be the set of jobs that are assigned
by S to machines in R but assigned by OPT to machines in Q, and let X(R 7→ Q) be the weight of the jobs
in J(R 7→ Q). Let R1, and R2 be a partition of the set of machines R. Then we have
X(R) ≤ X(R 7→ {1, . . . ,m} \R) = X(R 7→ R1) +X(R 7→ R2) . (2)
In particular, using the shorthand notation above, we have that for 1 ≤ y < σ ≤ m,
X(≤ y) ≤ X(≤ y 7→> y) = X(≤ y 7→ y + 1 . . . σ) +X(≤ y 7→ σ + 1 . . .m) . (3)
Similarly, for 1 ≤ σ < y ≤ m we have
X(≤ y) ≤ X(≤ σ) +X(σ + 1 . . . y) . (4)
4.3 Partition into phases
Definition 1. We partition the machines 1, . . . ,m into disjoint sets of consecutive machines called phases,
Φ1, Φ2, . . ., where machines of Φi precede those of Φi+1. We define ρ0 = 0 and ρi = max{j | j ∈ Φi} for i ≥ 1.
Thus, it follows that Φi = {ρi−1 + 1, . . . , ρi}. It also follows that machines in Φi are no slower than those of
Φi+1. Let ni be number of machines in the ith phase, i.e., ni = ρi − ρi−1, for i ≥ 1.
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To determine Φi it suffices to know ρi−1 and ρi. For i = 1 we define ρ1 = 1, as ρ0 = 0 it follows that
Φ1 = {1}. We define ρi+1 inductively using both ρi and ρi−1 as follows.
ρi+1 = argminσ
{
X(≤ ρi 7→> σ) < X(≤ ρi−1) + X (Φi)2
}
. (5)
The phases have the following properties.
Lemma 2. Let ` be the minimal load of a machine in phases 1, . . . , i, (` = min{`(σ)|1 ≤ σ ≤ ρi}), then
ni+1 ≥ ni(`− 1)/2.
Proof. By the inductive definition of ρi+1 above (Equation 5), we have that
X(≤ ρi 7→> ρi+1) < X(≤ ρi−1) + X (Φi)2 .
Now, since X(≤ ρi) ≤ X(≤ ρi 7→ Φi+1) +X(≤ ρi 7→> ρi+1), we have
X(≤ ρi 7→ Φi+1) ≥ X(≤ ρi)−X(≤ ρi 7→> ρi+1) (6)
> X(≤ ρi−1) +X (Φi)−
(
X(≤ ρi−1) + X (Φi)2
)
(7)
=
X (Φi)
2
; (8)
Equation (6) follows by rewriting Equation (2). Equation (7) follows from the definition of ρi+1 (Equation
(5)), and the rest is trivial manipulation.
Since the speed of any machine in Φi is no smaller than v(ρi) (the lowest speed of any machine in phases
1, . . . , i), and we have chosen ` to be the minimum load of any machine in the set ≤ ρi, for every machine
σ ∈ Φi the excess weight X(σ) = (`(σ)− 1)v(σ) ≥ (`− 1)v(ρi). Therefore by substituting this into (8) we get
X(≤ ρi 7→ Φi+1) > ni(`− 1)v(ρi)2 .
In OPT, no machine can have a load greater than one. Therefore since the speed of any machine in Φi+1
is no larger than v(ρi) at most v(ρi) of the weight is on one machine in Φi+1, so there are at least (`− 1)ni/2
machines in Φi+1. uunionsq
Lemma 3. Let j < i be two phases. If the minimal load of a machine ρj−1 ≤ k ≤ ρi is at least 3 then
X (Φi) > X (Φj).
Proof. Clearly it suffices to prove that X (Φi+1) > X (Φi) for every i > 0.
Since in OPT the load of every machine is at most one we have that
X(≤ ρi 7→ Φi+1) ≤
∑
σ∈Φi+1
v(σ). (9)
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This together with (8) gives that ∑
σ∈Φi+1
v(σ) >
X (Φi)
2
. (10)
Let ` be the minimal load of a machine in Φi+1. From our definition follows that
X (Φi+1) ≥ (`− 1)
∑
σ∈Φi+1
v(σ) . (11)
The lemma now follows by combining (10) and (11) together with the assumption that ` > 3. uunionsq
Let ` be the minimal load among machines 1, . . . , ρi. Let Γi be the subset of Φi that have at least (`− 1)/2
of their load contributed by jobs of weight w ≤ v(ρi+1).
Lemma 4. For i > j,
∑
σ∈Γi v(σ) ≥ v(ρj)nj(`− 1)/(`+ 3).
Proof. First we want to estimate X(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1). By rewriting Equation (2) we get that
X(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1) = X(≤ ρi 7→≥ ρi+1)−X(≤ ρi−1 7→≥ ρi+1) .
Since X(≤ ρi−1 7→≥ ρi+1) ≤ X(≤ ρi−1 7→> ρi), we also have that
X(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1) ≥ X(≤ ρi 7→≥ ρi+1)−X(≤ ρi−1 7→> ρi) . (12)
From the definition of ρi+1 follows that
X(≤ ρi 7→≥ ρi+1) ≥ X(≤ ρi−1) + X (Φi)2 , (13)
Similarly, from the definition of ρi follows that
X(≤ ρi−1 7→> ρi) < X(≤ ρi−2) + X (Φi−1)2 . (14)
Substituting Equations (13) and (14) into Equation (12) we get that
X(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1) ≥ X(≤ ρi−1) + X (Φi)2 −
(
X(≤ ρi−2) + X (Φi−1)2
)
≥ X(≤ ρi−2) +X (Φi−1) + X (Φi)2 −
(
X(≤ ρi−2) + X (Φi−1)2
)
≥ X (Φi−1)
2
+
X (Φi)
2
. (15)
Let A(σ) be the total weight of jobs j on machine σ with wj ≤ v(ρi+1) and let A(Φi) =
∑
σ∈Φi A(σ). Since
every job in J(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1) has weight of at most v(ρi+1), it follows that X(Φi 7→≥ ρi+1) ≤ A(Φi), and by
Equation (15)
A(Φi) ≥ X (Φi−1)2 +
X (Φi)
2
. (16)
We claim that every machine σ with A(σ) > 0 (i.e. the machine has at least one job j with wj ≤ v(ρi+1))
has load of at most `+ 1. To prove the claim, let q ≤ ρi+1 be a machine that has load greater than `+ 1 and
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a job j with wj ≤ v(ρi+1), and let q′ be the machine among 1, . . . , ρi with load `. This state is not a Nash
equilibrium since if job j switches to machine q′ it would have a smaller cost. We get that
A(Φi) ≤
∑
σ∈Γi
v(σ)(`+ 1) +
∑
σ∈Φi−Γi
v(σ)
`− 1
2
=
∑
σ∈Γi
v(σ)
`+ 3
2
+
∑
σ∈Φi
v(σ)
`− 1
2
≤
∑
σ∈Γi
v(σ)
`+ 3
2
+
X (Φi)
2
. (17)
Inequality (17) holds ` is the smallest load of a machine in 1, . . . , ρi. Combining (17) and (16) we get that∑
σ∈Γi
v(σ)
`+ 3
2
+
X (Φi)
2
≥ X (Φi−1)
2
+
X (Φi)
2
, (18)
and therefore ∑
σ∈Γi
v(σ)
`+ 3
2
≥ X (Φi−1)
2
≥ X (Φj)
2
≥ v(ρj)nj `− 12 . (19)
The first inequality in (19) follows from (18), the second follows from Lemma 3, and the third inequality follows
since ` is the smallest load of a machine in 1, . . . , ρi and since v(ρj) is the smallest speed in Φj . From (19) the
lemma clearly follows. uunionsq
Recall that `max is the maximum load in S. Define k to be min{i | `(i) < `max/2}. Let t be the phase such
that ρt < k and ρt+1 ≥ k. Consider machines 1, . . . , ρt. From now on ` would be the minimal load of a machine
in this set of machines. Then, ` = Θ(`max), and we may assume that ` is large enough.
Definition 2. We define another partition of the machines into shifted phases (s-phases) Ψ1, Ψ2, . . . based on
the partition to phases Φ1, Φ2, . . . as follows. We define ϕ0 = 0. Let ϕi be the slowest machine in Φi such that
at least (` − 1)/2 of its load is contributed by jobs with weight w ≤ v(ρi+1) (there exists such a machine by
Lemma 4). We define Ψi = {ϕi−1 + 1, . . . , ϕi}.
Note that there is a bijection between the s-phases Ψ1, Ψ2, . . . and the phases Φ1, Φ2, . . .. Furthermore, all
machines in Φi such that at least (`− 1)/2 of their load is contributed by jobs of weight ≤ v(ρi+1) are in Ψi.
Lemma 5. The load difference between machines ϕ2 and ϕt, `(ϕ2)− `(ϕt) > `max/4 + 4.
Proof. According to the definition of Ψi, there is a job on machine ϕi with weight w ≤ v(ρi+1) ≤ v(ϕi+1) and
therefore it contributes load of at most 1 to machine ϕi+1. As S is a Nash equilibrium, the load difference
between machines ϕi and ϕi+1 is at most 1. The load on the fastest machine ϕ1 is `(ϕ1) > `max−1 since every job
contributes a load of at most 1 to it. Thus, the load on machine ϕ2 ∈ Φ2 is at least `(ϕ2) ≥ `(ϕ1)−1 ≥ `max−2.
The load on machine ϕt is `(ϕt) ≤ `max/2 + 1, since there is a job with weight of at most v(ϕt+1) on ϕs
and by the definition of ϕi there is a machine k ≤ ϕt+1 with load less than `max/2.
10
Therefore, the load difference between machines ϕ2 and ϕt is at least (`max−2)−(`max/2+1) > `max/4+4,
for `max sufficiently large (> 28). uunionsq
We define zi+1 to be v(ϕi)/v(ϕi+1). Notice that zi+1 ≥ 1. We redefine Γb to be the subset of machines of Ψb
such that for every such machine, at least (`−1)/2 of the load is contributed by jobs with weight w ≤ v(ϕb+1).
For two s-phases Ψa, and Ψb the lemma below relates the difference in load of ϕa and ϕb, to the ratio of speeds
v(ϕa) and v(ϕb).
Lemma 6. Consider s-phases Ψa and Ψb such that a < b. Let ` be the minimal load in Ψa and Ψb. If
v(ϕa)/v(ϕb) ≤ za+1(`− 1)/5 then `(ϕa) ≤ `(ϕb) + 4/zb+1.
Proof. Proof by contradiction, assume that `(ϕa) = `(ϕb) + α/zb+1, for some α > 4, and that v(ϕa)/v(ϕb) ≤
za+1(`−1)/5. We exhibit a deviating coalition all of whose members reduce their observed loads, contradicting
the assumption that the current state is a strong equilibrium.
We observe that for every machine σ ∈ Γb we have `(σ) ≤ `(ϕb) + 1/zb+1.(From this also follows that
`(σ) < `(ϕa).) If not, take any job j located on σ, such that wσ ≤ v(ϕb+1) and send it to machine ϕb, the
contribution of job j to the load of ϕb is at most v(ϕb+1)/v(ϕb) = 1/zb+1, i.e., the current state is not even a
Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we have `(ϕb) ≤ `(σ) + 1/zb+1.
We group jobs on ϕa in a way such that the current load contribution of each group is greater than 1/(2za+1)
and no more than 1/za+1. I.e., for one such group of jobs G, 1/(2za+1) <
∑
j∈G wj/v(ϕa) ≤ 1/za+1. At least
za+1(` − 1)/2 such groups are formed. Every such group is assigned a unique machine in Γb and all jobs
comprising the group migrate to this machine. Let Γ ⊆ Γb be a subset of machines that got an assignment,
|Γ | = min{za+1(` − 1)/2, |Γb|}. The load contributed by migrating jobs to the target machine, σ ∈ Γb, is
therefore ∑
j∈G
wj
v(σ)
≤
∑
j∈G
wj
v(ϕb)
,
we also know that v(ϕa)/v(ϕb) ≤ za+1(`− 1)/5 and
∑
j∈G wj/v(ϕa) ≤ 1/za+1, this gives us that∑
j∈G
wj
v(ϕb)
≤
∑
j∈G
wj
v(ϕa)
· v(ϕa)
v(ϕb)
≤ (`− 1)/5.
Therefore, after migration, the load on σ ∈ Γb is ≤ `(σ)+ (`− 1)/5 ≤ `(ϕa)+ (`− 1)/5. It is also at least `(ϕa)
(otherwise S is not a Nash equilibrium).
Additionally, jobs will also migrate from machines σ ∈ Γ to machine ϕa (not the same jobs previously sent
the other way). We choose jobs to migrate from σ ∈ Γ to ϕa, so that the final load on σ is strictly smaller
than `(ϕa) and at least `(ϕa) − 1/zb+1 = `(ϕb) + (α − 1)/zb+1. It has to be smaller than `(ϕa) to guarantee
that every job migrating from ϕa to σ observes a load strictly smaller than the load it observed before the
deviation. We want it to be at least `(ϕb) + (α− 1)/zb+1, so that a job migrating to ϕa from σ would observe
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a smaller load as we will show below. To achieve this, slightly more than (`− 1)/5 of the load of σ ∈ Γ has to
migrate back to ϕa.
The jobs that migrate from σ ∈ Γ to ϕa are those jobs with load ≤ 1/zb+1 on σ. Therefore, each such job
which leaves σ reduces the load of σ by at most 1/zb+1. Since the total load of these jobs on σ is (`− 1)/2 >
(` − 1)/5, we can successively send jobs from σ to ϕa until the load drops below to some value y such that
`(ϕb) + (α− 1)/zb+1 ≤ y < `(ϕb) + α/zb+1.
We argued that prior to any migration, the load `(σ) ≤ `(ϕb)+1/zb+1 for σ ∈ Γb. Following the migrations
above, the new load `(σ) on machine σ is `(σ) ≥ `(ϕb) + (α− 1)/zb+1. Thus, the load on every such machine
has gone up by at least (α− 2)/zb+1.
If |Γ | = za+1(`− 1)/2 the net decrease in load on machine ϕa is at least∑
σ∈Γ
α− 2
zb+1
· v(σ)
v(ϕa)
≥
∑
σ∈Γ
α− 2
zb+1
· v(ϕb)
v(ϕa)
≥ za+1(`− 1)
2
· α− 2
zb+1
· 5
za+1(`− 1)
≥ 2.5(α− 2)
zb+1
>
α+ 1
zb+1
.
If |Γ | < za+1(`− 1)/2, then Γ = Γb and the net decrease in load on machine ϕa is at least∑
σ∈Γb
α− 2
zb+1
· v(σ)
v(ϕa)
≥ α− 2
zb+1v(ϕa)
∑
σ∈Γb
v(σ)
≥ α− 2
zb+1
· na(`− 1)
`+ 3
(20)
≥ 2.5(α− 2)
zb+1
>
α+ 1
zb+1
. (21)
Inequality (20) follows from Lemma 4. Inequality (21) holds for a > 1 (according to Lemma for a > 1 we
get that na > (`− 1)/2 ) and for ` ≥ 10.
Thus, the new load `(ϕa) on machine ϕa is at most
`(ϕa) < `(ϕb) + α/zb+1 − (α+ 1)/zb+1 = `(ϕb)− 1/zb+1,
which ensures that the jobs that migrate to machine ϕa could form a coalition, benefiting all members, in
contradiction to the strong equilibrium assumption. uunionsq
We define a partition of the s-phases into blocks B0, B1, . . .. The first block B0 consists of the first two
s-phases. Given blocks B0, . . . , Bj−1, define Bj as follows: For all i, let ai be the first s-phase of block Bi and
let bi be be the last s-phase of block Bi. The first s-phase of Bj is s-phase bj−1 + 1, i.e., aj = bj−1 + 1.
To specify the last phase of Bj we define a consecutive set of s-phases denoted by P1, where bj ∈ P1.
The first s-phase in P1 is aj . The last s-phase of P1 is the first phase, indexed p, following aj , such that
v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕp) > zaj (` − 1)/5. Note that P1 always contains at least two s-phases. Let m1 be an s-phase in
P1 \ {aj} such that zm1 ≥ zi for every i in P1 \ {aj}. We consider two cases:
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– Case 1: zm1 ≥ log `. We define bj = m1 − 1. In this case we refer to Bj as a block of a type I.
– Case 2: zm1 < log `. We define P2 to be the suffix of P1 containing all s-phases i for which v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕi) ≥
zaj ((`− 1)/5)2/3. Note that s-phase p is in P2 and s-phase aj is not in P2. Let m2 be an s-phase in P2 such
that zm2 ≥ zi for every i in P2. We define bj to be m2− 1. In this case we refer to Bj as a block of type II.
If v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕt) ≤ zaj (`− 1)/5 we do not define Bj and Bj−1 is the last block.
For each block Bj let P (Bj) be the s-phases which we map to Bj . In Case 1 we define P (Bj) = m1 = aj+1.
In Case 2 we define P (Bj) = P2.
Lemma 7. The number of s-phases associated with block Bj, |P (Bj)|, is Ω(log `/zaj+1).
Proof. If zm1 ≥ log ` then P (Bj) consists of a single phase. As log `/zm1 < 1, the claim trivially follows. Assume
that zm1 < log `. Let s be the first s-phase in P2, then
v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕs−1) ≤ zaj
(
`− 1
5
)2/3
. (22)
Let k be the last s-phase of P2 (which is also the last s-phase of P1), we have that
v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕk) ≥ zaj
`− 1
5
. (23)
If we divide (22) by (23) we obtain that v(ϕk)/v(ϕs−1) ≥ ((`− 1)/5)1/3. Let q be the number of s-phases in
P2. Since zm2 ≥ zi for all i ∈ P2 it follows that (zm2)q ≥ ((`− 1)/5)1/3. We conclude that q = Ω(log `/zm2) =
Ω(log `/zaj+1), as log x ≤ x for all x. uunionsq
The following lemma shows each s-phase is mapped into at most one block.
Lemma 8. For every pair of blocks B, and B′ we have P (B)
⋂
P (B′) = ∅.
Proof. This is clear if B is of type I and B′ is of type II since we map to blocks of type I s-phase i for which
zi < log ` and we map to blocks of type II s-phases i for which zi < log `.
The statement is also holds if both B and B′ are of type I since each block is of size at least two. So we
are left with case where both B and B′ are of type II.
It is enough to prove it for two consecutive blocks Bj and Bj+1.
Let x1,y1 be the first and the last phase in P (Bj), and let x2 be the first phase in P (Bj+1).
From the definition of P (Bj) follows:
v(ϕbj−1) / v(ϕx1) ≥ zaj ((`− 1)/5)2/3 , (24)
v(ϕbj−1) / v(ϕy1) > zaj (`− 1)/5 , (25)
v(ϕbj−1) / v(ϕy1−1) ≤ zaj (`− 1)/5 . (26)
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Since both blocks Bj and Bj+1 are of type II, we have v(ϕy1−1)/v(ϕy1) < log ` and therefore,
v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕy1) < zaj log `(`− 1)/5 . (27)
Using Inequality (27) and Inequality (24), we get
v(ϕy1) >
v(ϕx1)
log `((`− 1)/5)1/3 . (28)
According to the definition, bj ≥ x1 − 1 and therefore v(ϕbj ) = zaj+1v(ϕx1). By substituting it in (28) we get,
v(ϕy1) >
v(ϕbj )
zaj+1 log `((`− 1)/5)1/3
. (29)
From the definition of P (bj+1) follows:
v(ϕbj )/v(ϕx2) ≥ zaj+1((`− 1)/5)2/3 . (30)
Therefore, we get that
v(ϕx2) ≤
v(ϕbj )
zaj+1((`− 1)/5)2/3
. (31)
In order to avoid collision it have to be v(ϕx2) < v(ϕy1), so it is enough to show that
v(ϕbj )
zaj+1 log `((`− 1)/5)1/3
>
v(ϕbj )
zaj+1((`− 1)/5)2/3
(32)
The inequality holds for log ` < ((`− 1)/5)1/3. uunionsq
We now conclude the proof of the upper bound of the strong price of anarchy. By definition, we have that
v(ϕbj−1)/v(ϕbj ) ≤ zaj (`− 1)/5, so using Lemma 6 we get that
`(ϕbj−1)− `(ϕbj ) ≤ 4/zaj . (33)
Let f be the index of the last block. Then, bf is the last phase of this block. We have that v(ϕbf )/v(ϕt) ≤
zbf+1(`− 1)/5, (where t is the last phase with minimal load > `max/2) so by Lemma 6, `(ϕbf ) ≤ `(ϕt) + 4. By
Lemma 5, `(ϕ2) − `(ϕt) ≥ `max/4 + 4. Therefore, `(ϕ2) − `(ϕbf ) ≥ `max/4. This together with Equation (33)
gives that
Θ(`max) = `(ϕ2)− `(ϕbf ) =
∑
j=1,...,f
(
`(ϕbj−1)− `(ϕbj )
) ≤ ∑
j=1,...,f
4/zbj+1 . (34)
Using Lemma 7 and Inequality (34) the total number of s-phases is∑
i=1,...,f
Ω(log `)/zbi+1 = log `
∑
i=1,...,f
1/zbi+1 = Ω(`max log `max) .
As described in the proof sketch this gives `max = O(logm/(log logm)2) as required. We conclude:
Theorem 2. The strong price of anarchy for m related machines is Θ
(
logm/(log logm)2
)
.
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5 Unrelated Machines
5.1 Strong Price of Anarchy
We can show that the strong price of anarchy for m unrelated machine load balancing is at most m, improving
the 2m−1 upper bound given by Andelman et al. [2]. Our new upper bound is tight since it matches the lower
bound shown in [2].
Theorem 3. The strong price of anarchy for m unrelated machine load balancing is at most m.
Proof. Omitted. Let s be a strong equilibrium. Let M1, . . . ,Mm be the machines ordered by decreasing loads
in s, and let `1 ≥ `2 ≥ · · · ≥ `m be their loads in s.
Note that `m ≤ OPT. If `m > OPT then all jobs benefit from cooperating and moving to the optimal state
OPT.
Next, we argue that `i ≤ `i+1 + OPT for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Assume that for some i, `i+1 = x and
`i > x + OPT . Consider a coalition of all jobs running on machines Mj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i, where each such job
migrates to run on the machine in which it runs in state OPT. A job which migrates to a machine Mk for
k ≥ i+ 1 observes a load of at most x+OPT which is strictly smaller than what it had previously observed.
A job that migrates to machine Mk for 1 ≤ k ≤ i observes a load of ≤ OPT which is also strictly smaller than
the previously observed load. This contradicts the assumption that s was a strong equilibrium.
Applying the argument above repeatedly, we conclude that `1 ≤ `m + (m − 1)OPT . Combining this with
the fact that `m ≤ OPT concludes the proof. uunionsq
5.2 k-Strong Price of Anarchy
In this section we consider coalitions of size at most k, where k ≥ m (for k < m the upper bound is unbounded).
Andelman et al. [2] show that for m machines and n ≥ m players the k-strong price of anarchy is O(nm2/k)
and Ω(n/k). We give a refined analysis:
Theorem 4. The k-strong price of anarchy for m unrelated machine load balancing, k ≥ m, and given n jobs,
c = Θ(m(n−m)/(k−m)), more precisely, (m− 1)(n−m+1)/(k−m+1) ≤ c ≤ 2m(n−m+1)/(k−m+2).
Proof. If k < m then the k-strong price of anarchy is unbounded as shown in [2]. Thus, k ≥ m. Consider the
following scenario with m unrelated machines and n jobs. Each of the jobs has a finite weight only on two
machines. Let x = (m − 1)(n −m + 1)/(k −m + 1). For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, the weight of job i on machine i
is 1 and its weight on machine i+ 1 is x−m+ i+ 1. For i ∈ {m, . . . , n} the weight of job i on machine m is
1/(n−m+ 1) and its weight on machine 1 is x/(n−m+ 1). See Figure 2.
The optimal solution assigns job i to machine i for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, and all other jobs are assigned to
machine m. So, the load on all machines is 1 and the makespan is 1.
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1 2 .. m− 2 m− 1 m, ... ,n
M1 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ xn−m+1
M2 x−m+ 2 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
M3 ∞ x−m+ 3 .. ∞ ∞ ∞
.. ∞ ∞ .. ∞ ∞ ∞
Mm−2 ∞ ∞ .. 1 ∞ ∞
Mm−1 ∞ ∞ ∞ x− 1 1 ∞
Mm ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ x 1n−m+1
Fig. 2. This example shows that the k-strong price of anarchy ≥ (m− 1)(n−m+ 1)/(k −m+ 1).
Consider the following state which we claim is a k-strong equilibrium. Assign job i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, to
machine i+ 1. Job i is the only job that runs on machine i+ 1 which therefore has load of x−m+ i+ 1, all
other jobs run on machine 1 with a total load of x, see Figure 3.
n
m+ 1
m
1 2 m− 2 m− 1n− 1
L2 = x−m+ 2L1 = x L3 = x−m+ 3 Lm = xLm−1 = x− 1
Fig. 3. Example of a Strong Equilibrium.
Since machinem has load of x which is the same as the load on machine 1 no job i ∈ {m, . . . , n} has incentive
to migrate to machine m unless job m−1 leaves machine m. Furthermore, in order for job i, i ∈ {2, . . . ,m−1},
to join a coalition and move from machine i+ 1 to machine i, job i− 1 has to leave machine i. So any coalition
must include at least one job from each machine.
The load on machine 2 is x −m + 2 and the load on machine 1 is x. Hence the load of machine 1 must
decrease by more thanm−1 so it would be beneficial for job 1 to migrate from machine 2 to machine 1. In order
to reduce the load of machine 1 by more than m−1 units of weight, more than (m−1)(n−m+1)/x = k−m+1
jobs have to migrate from machine 1. Thus, such a coalition must include > k −m + 1 jobs from machine 1
and all jobs 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, jointly these are more than k jobs. Since the largest allowable coalition is of size
k, this deviation is illegal and, therefore, this state is a k-strong equilibrium. uunionsq
16
Remark:We can improve the lower bound of Theorem 4 to ((m− 1)(n−m+1)+1)/(k−m+1) by a slightly
more careful choice of parameters.
Definition 3. Let M1, . . . ,Mm be the machines sorted in decreasing order of load in state s. We say that Mi
and Mj, are directly connected, and denote this by Mi ½s Mj, if i < j and there is a job that runs on Mj in
OPT and runs on Mi in s.
We say that machines Mi and Mj, i < j, are connected in state s if there exist machines Mi′ and Mj′ such
that i′ ≤ i, j ≤ j′, and Mi′ and Mj′ are directly connected.
Let C(s) = M1, . . . ,M` denote the maximal prefix of machines (when ordered by decreasing loads), such
that Mi+1 is connected to Mi in state s.
A variation of this definition was also used by [2]. We use the following lemma which is proved in [2].
Lemma 9. [2] Let s be a Nash equilibrium. Let M1, . . . ,Mm be the machines sorted by decreasing load in s,
and let `i be the load on machine Mi. If Mi ½s Mj then `i ≤ `j + OPT . In addition, for any i, j ∈ C(s) we
have `i ≤ `j + (m− 1)OPT .
Proof. The proof can be found in [2].
Theorem 5. For any job scheduling game with m unrelated machines, n jobs, k ≥ m, and n ≥ m, the k-strong
price of anarchy is at most 2m(n−m+ 1)/(k −m+ 2).
Proof. Let s be a strong Nash equilibrium with the largest makespan amongst all Nash equilibria and let
C(s) = M1, . . . ,M`. Also let `max be the load on M1, the machine with the largest load, and let `min be the
load on M`, the machine with the smallest load in C(s). Note that if `min ≤ OPT, then, by Lemma 9, the
k-strong price of anarchy ≤ m ≤ 2m(n−m+ 1)/(k−m+ 2). So we may assume for the rest of the proof that
`min > OPT.
For every i ≤ ` let Si be a subset of jobs that run on machine Mi ∈ C(s) of minimal cardinality, such that∑
j∈Si wi(j) > `i − `min +OPT. Let si = |Si|.
We claim that
∑
i:Mi∈C(s) si > k. To establish this claim we show that if
∑
i:Mi∈C(s) si ≤ k then the jobs
in ∪`i=1Si can jointly migrate so that they all benefit. This contradicts the assumption that s is a k-strong
equilibrium. If k = n then we cannot have
∑
i:Mi∈C(s) si > k which means that `min could not have been larger
than OPT and therefore the k-strong price of anarchy is ≤ m.
To prove the claim let each job j ∈ ∪`i=1Si migrate to the machine on which it runs in state OPT. Consider
a machine Mi ∈ C(s). Since
∑
j∈Si wi(j) > `i − `min +OPT the sum of the loads of the jobs leaving machine
Mi is at least `i− `min+OPT. But the sum of the loads of the jobs migrating to machine Mi is at most OPT.
So the new load on machine Mi is less than `i − (`i − `min +OPT)+OPT = `min. This means that every job
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migrating to a machine in C(s) sees an improvement. By definition of C(s), no job migrates to a machine Mi,
i > `, the claim follows.
Let k′ =
∑
i:Mi∈C(s) si. We now know that k
′ > k. Note that the number of machines in C(s) is ` and let
ni be the number of jobs running on machine Mi in s for every 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
For every i such that si > 1 the weight of any si − 1 jobs is at most `i − `min +OPT otherwise Si is not of
minimal cardinality. Therefore the total load on Mi is
`i ≤ ni(`i − `min +OPT)
si − 1 . (35)
Let x be the number of machines in C(s) for which si > 1. Since k′ > m there exists some i such that
si > 1 and hence x ≥ 1. The total number of jobs on machines with si > 1 is
∑
i:si>1
ni ≤ n − (` − x). Also∑
i:si>1
si = k′ − (`− x).
We argue that there exists a machine Mi with si > 1 such that
ni ≤ si(n− `+ x)
k′ − `+ x . (36)
Indeed, if this is not true, for every such i we have ni > si(n− `+ x)/(k′ − `+ x). Summing over all machines
we obtain that ∑
i:si>1
ni >
∑ si(n− `+ x)
k′ − `+ x =
(n− `+ x)∑ si
k′ − `+ x = n− `+ x .
which is a contradiction.
Let Mp be a machine for which Equation (36) holds. Then using Equations (35) and (36) we obtain that
`p ≤ np(`p − `min +OPT)
sp − 1 ≤
sp(n− `+ x)(`p − `min +OPT)
(sp − 1)(k′ − `+ x) .
Since `max = `p + (`max − `p) we have that
`max ≤ sp(n− `+ x)(`p − `min +OPT)(sp − 1)(k′ − `+ x) + (`max − `p) ,
and since sp(n−`+x)(sp−1)(k′−`+x) > 1 we obtain that
`max ≤ sp(n− `+ x)(`max − `min +OPT)(sp − 1)(k′ − `+ x) .
Recall that by Lemma 9, `max − `min ≤ (`− 1)OPT, so we obtain that
`max ≤ sp(n− `+ x)`(sp − 1)(k′ − `+ x)OPT .
Since sp/(sp − 1) ≤ 2
`max ≤ 2(n− `+ x)`
k′ − `+ x OPT ,
and since (n−`+x)`k′−`+x is maximized for x = 1, ` = m, and k
′ = k + 1, the lemma follows. uunionsq
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